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ABSTRACT 
In anticipation of a future social interaction, socially anxious individuals 
(SAIs) may imagine themselves appearing stupid or foolish and predict and 
exaggerate the probability and costs of conveying these undesirable social 
images both on oneself (e.g., “I will feel stupid”) and on others impressions of 
oneself (e.g., “Others will think I’m stupid”).  However, there is a paucity of 
research examining the latter bias; moreover, research regarding SAIs estimates 
of the probability and costs of conveying a positive impression (e.g., “I will feel 
smart”) has typically been neglected. Thus, the a novel questionnaire was 
created in order to develop a more comprehensive model of SAIs estimates of 
probability and costs. We expected that positive and negative, self- and other-
related judgments will represent four distinct, latent constructs that will be related 
to trait social anxiety indirectly through fears of positive and negative evaluation 
per the evolutionary model of social anxiety. Structural equation modeling was 
used to test study hypotheses. The final sample included four hounded and 
seventy-four college students (307 males and 167 females). Results generally 
supported study hypotheses. After minor theoretically justified modifications, the 
hypothesized model provided good fit to the data, χ2(94) = 151.78, CFI = .99, TLI 
= .99, RMSEA = .04.  All social appraisals with the exception of other-negative 
appraisals were indirectly related to social anxiety through fears of positive and 
negative evaluation. Contrary to expectations, other-positive appraisals were 
negatively related to fear of negative evaluation and other-negative appraisals 
iv 
were uncorrelated with fear of positive evaluation, providing partial incremental 
validity of the novel questionnaire used in this study. Results provide preliminary 
evidence that suggests future research should extend evaluation of SAIs 
anticipatory social appraisals beyond negative, self-related social impact. 
Implications, limitations, and future directions of the research are be discussed. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Cognitive models assert that social anxiety is maintained by biased 
information processing, including biases in attention towards threat-related social 
cues, more negative and less positive interpretations of ambiguous social 
situations, and judgment biases involving exaggerated estimates of the 
probability and cost of negative social situations (Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001; 
Hirsch & Clark, 2004). In regards to the latter cognitive bias, cognitive models of 
anxiety posit that specific judgmental biases may exist across the range of 
anxiety disorders, and may play a causal role in their development and 
persistence (e.g., Beck Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Foa & Kozak, 1986; Clark & 
Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).   
Indeed, although conventional wisdom argues that our emotions directly 
cause our behavior (e.g., anxiety causes avoidance), it is often our judgments of 
future events that have implications for what we pursue and what we avoid (see, 
Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007). As a result, from a cognitive-
behavioral standpoint, socially anxious individuals’ anticipatory judgmental biases 
may be one of the more important cognitive mechanisms through which social 
anxiety is maintained. Research has shown that socially anxious individuals 
(SAIs) overestimate the probability and costs of negative social events (e.g., Foa, 
Franklin, Perry, & Herbert, 1996). That is, compared to non-anxious controls 
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(NACs), SAIs estimate that a negative social event will be more likely to occur 
and have dramatically greater negative consequences if it were to actually 
happen. 
Moreover, treatment studies have established that one of the mechanisms 
of change for cognitive-behavioral treatments for social anxiety are reductions in 
probability and cost estimates (e.g., Hoffman, 2004; Foa et al, 1996; Gregory, 
Peters, Abbott, Gaston & Rapee, 2015). However, most studies of inflated 
probability and cost estimates have primarily examined SAIs estimates of the 
impact of negative social events upon oneself (e.g., Foa et al., 1996; Uren, 
Szabo, & Lovibond, 2004; Nelson, Deacon, Lickel, & Sy, 2010) and not SAIs’ 
estimates of the impact the social event would have on other peoples’ 
perceptions of oneself. Additionally, these studies have also typically neglected 
the assessment of SAIs’ probability and cost estimates of anticipated positive 
social events/outcomes. Because of these limitations in previous studies, I argue 
that research has failed to adequately address the comprehensive nature of 
SAI’s judgmental biases. 
Self and Other’s Perceptions of Oneself 
When socially anxious individuals anticipate a future social interaction they 
typically engage in anticipatory processing that consists largely of negative self-
images, and thoughts of how they will be perceived by others (Clark & Wells, 
1995, Hinrischsen and Clark, 2003; Vassilopoulos, 2005). To infer how they will 
be viewed by others, SAIs engage in self-focused attention, erroneously relying 
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upon their own emotions and bodily sensations to infer what others are thinking 
(Clark & Wells, 1995; Clark, 2001). For instance, a socially anxious individual 
who is ridden with anxiety and self-doubt in anticipation of a speech may use this 
self-induced anxiety and doubt to infer that others will perceive them as 
incompetent or unintelligent. This suggests that when SAIs anticipate a social 
interaction, they not only anticipate the impact that the social outcome would 
have on oneself (e.g., “I am going to appear incompetent and I will feel like a 
stupid person”), but also the impact that the social outcome would have on others 
perception of oneself (e.g., “I am going to appear incompetent and people will 
think I’m a stupid person) (Clark & Wells, 1995; Alden & Taylor, 2004, 2010; 
Taylor & Alden, 2008).  
Judgmental Biases of Oneself 
Supporting the existence of self-related judgmental biases, Foa, Franklin, 
Perry, and Herbert (1996) examined the probability and cost estimates of 
negative social and non-social situations among a group of individuals diagnosed 
with generalized social phobia (GSP) and non-anxious controls (NACs). The 
researchers also examined the effectiveness of a cognitive behavioral treatment 
for reducing probability and cost estimates.  Fifteen individuals who, according to 
DSM-III-R criteria, were diagnosed with GSP were recruited for the study. Any 
participant meeting criteria for major depression, substance abuse or 
dependence, a history of psychotic disorder or the presence of another anxiety 
disorder was excluded from the study.  
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A questionnaire consisting of participants probability and cost estimates of 
20 negative socially irrelevant events (e.g., “You will lose your house keys”) and 
20 negative socially relevant events (e.g., “During a job interview, you will 
freeze”; “Someone you know won’t say hello to you”) was administered. All four 
scales demonstrated high internal consistency. The participants also received 
14-week group cognitive-behavioral therapy for social anxiety consisting of 
exposure, cognitive restructuring and social skills training. Matched t-tests 
between pre and post treatment scores revealed large effect sizes on measures 
of social anxiety and depression, indicating that the treatment was effective in 
reducing social anxiety. Moreover, at pretreatment, SAIs rated negative social 
situations as more costly and probable compared to NACs. Results indicated that 
SAIs had higher probability estimates at pre and post-treatment for social events 
compared to nonsocial events, but that social estimates of probability and cost 
decreased from pre to post-treatment, revealing a large effect.  
Although the previous study was conducted with a small sample (n = 15), 
subsequent research has found similar results (e.g., Uren, Szabo, & Lovibond, 
2004; Nelson et al., 2010; Taylor & Alden, 2008; Trew & Alden, 2009; 
Moscovitch, Rodebaguh & Hesch, 2012; Moscovitch, Waechter, Bielak, Rowa & 
McCabe, 2015). For instance, SAIs tend to overestimate the negative impact of 
imagined social mishaps on oneself (e.g., appearing anxious or clumsy; 
Moscovitch, Rodebaugh & Hesch, 2012), this finding has also extended to 
individuals diagnosed with social anxiety disorder who have been shown to 
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exaggerate the costs of imagined social mishaps compared to both anxious and 
non-anxious controls (Moscovitch, Waechter, Bielak, Rowa & McCabe, 2015). 
These studies, however, did not assess SAI’s probability and costs estimates of 
others’ perceptions of oneself.  
Judgmental Biases of Others’ Perceptions 
There is reason to believe that, in addition to inflated probability and cost 
estimates on oneself, SAIs also have inflated estimates of a social events impact 
on others’ perceptions of oneself. The nature of social anxiety is such that it can 
be conceptualized as a fear of the self as a social object for others. That is, 
cognitive and evolutionary models of social anxiety propose that SAIs may have 
an underlying fear that one is an aversive social object for others and will thus 
evoke negative evaluation and resulting loss of interest and ostracism, etc. (Clark 
& Wells, 1995; Gilbert, 2001; Trower & Gilbert, 1989; Moscovitch, 2009). Indeed, 
research has revealed that decreases in SAIs anticipatory estimates of cost on 
others perceptions correlates with reductions in social anxiety (Taylor & Alden, 
2008). Furthermore, reductions in the extent to which SAIs evaluations of 
themselves were dependent on feedback from others was also associated with 
treatment outcome. These findings provide evidence for the existence of SAIs 
exaggerated anticipatory judgements of others perceptions, but the clinical 
literature lacks additional research in this area. 
However, findings from the social psychology literature on the spotlight 
effect provide a possible explanation of why SAIs may anticipate exaggerated 
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reactions from others. Research on the spotlight effect suggests that people 
overestimate how much other people pay attention to their external appearance 
(Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 2000). In other words, people tend to think they 
are in the spotlight when, in fact, they are not. For example, when, on a 
particularly hasty day, one has spilled coffee on their shirt, the appearance of the 
light brown stain is perceived to be exaggeratedly apparent to others as one 
walks into their morning meeting.  
To study this spotlight effect, Gilovich, Savitky, and Medvec (2000) 
recruited one hundred and nine unselected undergraduate students. These 
participants were asked to walk into a room with an embarrassing shirt on (e.g., 
with a picture of a dated pop-star prominently displayed) and make estimates of 
the number of people who noticed their shirt. This estimate was then compared 
with the actual number of people who noticed the shirt. Results indicated that, 
compared to the actual estimates, the person wearing the embarrassing shirt 
overestimated the number who noticed the shirt. The researchers found the 
same effect when participants were asked to wear a shirt of their choice, 
suggesting that this effect generalizes to non-embarrassing situations. 
Importantly, the spotlight effect was found to exist for positive behavioral acts of 
self-presentation as well. Groups of three to seven participants were asked to 
engage in a group discussion and estimate their advancement of the group 
discussion, and the amount of remarkable comments they made as seen by 
others. Again, the researchers found that people overestimated the extent to 
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which others noticed one’s contributions to the group. This suggests that the 
spotlight effect occurs in both positive and negative social situations.  
Additional findings suggest an illusion of transparency or the tendency for 
people to feel that their internal thoughts and feelings (e.g., self-doubt, anxiety) 
are seen by others more than they actually are (Gilovich, Medvec, & Savitsky, 
1998). For example, participants overestimate the extent to which others would 
detect their lies. This finding has been shown to generalize to emotions of 
disgust, in which participants were asked to taste a series of foul-tasting drinks 
and maintain an as neutral impression as possible. Nonetheless, participants 
overestimated the extent to which their disgust was detected by observers. 
Researchers have hypothesized on the proximal cause of these overestimations. 
The spotlight effect and the illusion of transparency have been proposed 
to stem from an anchoring and adjustment process wherein people anchor on 
their current emotional state to judge others perceptions. However, people 
typically recognize that other people are not as likely to be as focused on their 
presence as is oneself and adjust for this accordingly (Gilovich et al., 1998, 
2000). This adjustment is typically insufficient and results in an overestimation of 
others perceptions of oneself.  For instance, if participants wearing the 
embarrassing shirt were given time to habituate to the shirt and thus were less 
focused on the shirt, participant’s estimates were less biased compared to actual 
estimates. Furthermore, the illusion of transparency has been shown to manifest 
only in situations in which one is experiencing particularly pronounced internal 
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experiences, such as lying, and tasting a foul-tasting drink (Gilovich, Medvec, & 
Savitsky, 1998). In contrast, the illusion of transparency is not found among less 
pronounced internal experiences, such as telling the truth and tasting a pleasant 
tasting drink. This is also consistent with the anchoring and adjustment 
explanation in that when experiencing less intense emotions participants’ 
adjustments are made from a minor emotional anchor resulting in a less biased 
estimation of others perceptions. How is the anchoring and adjustment 
explanation relevant to SAIs estimates of others perceptions? 
 As individuals tend to anchor on their current emotional state and adjust 
accordingly, the heightened emotional arousal of SAIs may result in particularly 
biased adjustments due to a higher emotional anchor, augmented by heightened 
self-focused attention. Thus SAIs may not only overestimate the costs of 
negative social situations, they may also overestimate the costs on others 
perceptions of oneself. Consistent with this idea is research on Theory of Mind 
(ToM), indicating that when theorizing about others’ mental states, SAIs attribute 
more meaning and intensity to others emotional states and thoughts that are 
disproportionate to the context (Washburn, Wilson, Roes, Rnic, and Harkness 
(2016; Hezel & McNally, 2014). Moreover, previous research (Brown & Stopa, 
2007) has shown that SAIs in situations of high social evaluation exhibit elevated 
levels of a spotlight effect compared to SAIs in a situation of low social 
evaluation.  
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This was tested by a modified version of a measure that assesses public 
and private self-awareness. In the high social-evaluative condition participants 
performed a memory task while they were knowingly videotaped and were told 
that their performance would be evaluated later by experts. In the low social-
evaluative condition participants were secretly videotaped. Thirty participants in 
each condition were recruited based on cut off scores on the brief fear of 
negative evaluation scale. The researchers measured the spotlight effect and 
illusion of transparency by comparing participants rating of their own public and 
private self-awareness with the assessors. Results suggested that the spotlight 
effect was present under high social-evaluative condition compared to low, 
whereas the illusion of transparency did not differ across conditions. Socially 
anxious individuals in the high social-evaluative condition were more anxious and 
thus began from a higher emotional anchor when attempting to adjust for 
estimates of others perceptions.  
These findings suggest that SAIs are particularly prone to the spotlight 
effect, but only in certain social conditions (e.g., highly visible and evaluative 
social situations) and that the illusion of transparency was present across social 
situations and thus may reflect more of a stable trait. Accordingly, if SAIs 
overestimate their positive reactions to positive social events, this same 
insufficient adjustment may occur when SAIs are asked to estimate the costs of 
positive social situations on others perceptions of oneself. However, research in 
this area is sparse. 
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Judgmental Biases of Positive Social Events 
Although research supports the idea that SAIs overestimate the probability 
and costs of conveying a negative, undesirable impression to others, the 
question remains, do SAIs also overestimate the probability and costs of 
conveying a positive, desirable impression to others (e.g., “If I make a funny joke, 
everybody will think I’m an enjoyable person to be around and will want to hang 
out with me”)? While cognitive models assert that, when anticipating a social 
interaction, SAIs typically hold a negative image of themselves as they appear to 
others (e.g., looking boring or anxious), it seems reasonable to assume that there 
are times when SAIs do actually anticipate conveying a desired image to others 
(e.g., appearing funny or confident) as opposed to a negative, undesirable one. 
This is because these cognitive models also suggest that SAIs are highly 
motivated to convey a desired impression, although they may feel uncertain in 
doing so (Schlenker & Leary, 1982; Clark & Wells, 1995, Rapee & Heimberg, 
1997; Hoffman, 2007). Additionally, SAIs have been shown to value themselves 
based upon others’ appraisals (Alden & Taylor, 2008); that is, their sense of self 
may depend largely on others’ perceptions. Thus, one possible explanation for 
the existence of exaggerated positive judgmental biases is that, when 
anticipating making a desirable impression, SAIs may overestimate the 
probability and cost of this desirable impression due to the value this may bring 
to their sense of self.  
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Research on SAIs probability and cost estimates of future positive social 
situations has been mixed. Indirect evidence comes from Bielak and Moscovitch 
(2013) who had female SAIs imagine a hypothetical social interaction with a 
visibly confident (e.g., relaxed, strong, clear voice) male social partner. Results 
indicated that, compared to individuals low in social anxiety, SAIs had higher 
positive impressions of this confident partner in that they rated him as possessing 
higher amounts of desirable characteristics, such as ambition, happiness, 
achievement, and intelligence. These findings suggest that, if SAIs were to 
anticipate conveying such qualities themselves (e.g., appearing visibly confident 
to others), SAIs may overestimate the extent to which they, themselves, and 
others would react positively to such conveyed desirable qualities.  
In support of this notion, Gilboa-Schectman, Franklin and Foa (2000) 
directly assessed SAIs, non-anxious controls (NACs) and individuals diagnosed 
with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) anticipated reactions to positive and 
negative social scenarios on a variety of outcomes/domains including, 
probability, magnitude, duration, strength of bodily reactions and changes in self-
esteem. The researchers argued that previous research on judgmental biases 
entailed SAIs appraisals of neutral or moderate negative social events. Thus the 
differences between SAIs and NACs could possibly be due to SAIs tendency to 
interpret social events more negatively and consequently overestimate the 
corresponding social costs of these social events.  
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To rule out this interpretation bias, these researchers used unambiguous 
positive and negative social events. A factor analysis confirmed that the 
questionnaire consisted of three factors, positive and negative impact factors 
(magnitude, duration, bodily reaction, self-esteem) and a probability factor. The 
results of the factors scores indicated that SAIs had exaggerated expectations of 
emotional reactions to both negative and positive social events, compared to 
NACs and OCDs. However, SAIs did report stronger expectations for the impact 
of negative social events compared to positive social events with NACs reporting 
the opposite pattern. Specifically, SAIs overestimated the magnitude, duration, 
bodily reaction and change in self-esteem in reaction to negative social events 
relative to both OCDs and NACs. For positive events, SAIs overestimated the 
duration, bodily reaction and increase in self-esteem relative to their OCD and 
NAC counterparts. 
 In contrast, Vassilopoulos (2006) had individuals high and low in 
social anxiety estimate the probability and emotional costs of unambiguous 
positive and negative social events and found that the two groups did not differ in 
their predicted emotional costs of these positive events. However, this study did 
not emphasize the anticipation of these events or ensure that participants felt that 
they were certain about conveying a desired impression. Moreover, this study did 
not investigate other aspects of an emotional reaction as Gilboa-Schectman et al. 
(2000) had. Still, the participants in the Gilboa-Schectman et al. study had 
13 
unusually high levels of social anxiety, thus the findings may be attributable to 
the most severe levels social anxiety.  
Overall, it is still relatively unclear if SAIs actually do exhibit probability and 
cost biases when anticipating conveying a desired, positive impression. 
Moreover, minimal research has assessed SAIs anticipatory appraisals of others 
perceptions. Therefore, we argue that previous research has failed to develop a 
more comprehensive model of SAIs judgmental biases. Given that, to our 
knowledge, Gilboa-Schectman et al. (2000) is only the study to find a positive 
judgmental bias among SIAs, we created a questionnaire modeled after Gilboa-
Schectman et al’s study to gain a more comprehensive understanding of SAIs 
social anticipatory appraisals of self and other—including both types of valence. 
Social Impact Bias Scale 
Because previous research indicates that SAIs interpret positive scenarios 
more negatively and less positively than NACs (see Hirsch & Clark, 2004 for a 
review), it is important to make the social scenarios as unambiguous as possible. 
Thus, similar to Gilboa-Schectman et al. (2000), we did not want participants’ 
interpretations of the scenarios confounding their appraisals. That is, specifically 
in regards to assessing SAIs appraisals of conveying a desired impression, it is 
possible that participants may interpret a given social scenario negatively and we 
may thusly fail in measuring SAIs anticipatory appraisals of conveying a positive 
impression. Thus, in constructing the SIBS, care was taken to ensure that 
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participants were imagining and anticipating the probability and costs of social 
events in which they were certain of conveying a desired impression.  
I argue that although Gilboa-Schectman et al. (2000) attempted to remove 
ambiguity from social scenarios, participants’ responses may still have been 
confounded by their interpretations of the scenario when deciding whether or not 
a desirable impression will be conveyed. For example, when asked to rate the 
probability and costs of the social scenario “A co-worker thanks you for your help 
during a work crisis” the extent to which a positive impression has been 
conveyed is still left up to interpretation. That is, was the person’s response an 
exaggerated thanks or a mild praise for something that was expected to have 
been done anyway?  
Thus, Gilboa-Schectman et al.’s scenarios measuring positive appraisals 
(e.g., “A co-worker thanks you for your help during a work crisis.”) as well as 
other research with scenarios measuring negative appraisals (e.g., “I will be 
ridiculed for voicing my opinion”) imply the conveying of a certain impression; 
however, the anticipation of conveying an impression is ambiguous and 
susceptible to interpretation unless a reaction from the other person(s) in the 
scenario is made explicit. This is because theoretical formulations of social 
anxiety assert that when in anticipation of conveying a certain impression, SAIs 
are primarily concerned with how other people will respond, even adopting an 
observer perspective to imagine how they will appear in the eyes of others (e.g., 
Gilbert, 2001; Schlenker & Leary, 1982; Tower & Gilbert, 1989; Trower, Gilbert & 
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Sherling, 1990; Clark & Wells, 1995). Thus, it is the responses from other people 
that determines whether one has conveyed a desired or undesired impression. 
Moreover, although actual social situations typically entail ambiguous reactions 
from others (e.g., a nod of the head), I argue that anticipated social situations 
and their imagined desired and undesired impressions/outcomes are 
unambiguous in the SAIs mind (e.g., they anticipate eliciting a response of “that 
sounds stupid” or “that is impressive”).  
Measurement Model of the Social Impact Bias Scale 
The proposed measurement model of the SIBS is one consisting of 
separate, distinct, latent factors for social impact biases of self-positive, other-
positive, self-negative, and other-negative. Indicators of these domains will 
include magnitude, duration, bodily sensations, and self-esteem, with probability 
estimates constituting a separate factor for each of these four subscales. 
Additionally, given that self-esteem may function as a gauge of one’s sense of 
social belonging (i.e., sociometer hypothesis; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 
1995), it is possible that social impact and probability estimates of anticipated 
social impressions may cause self-esteem. That is, self-esteem may not be an 
indicator of overall social appraisals, but may be a consequence of one’s social 
appraisals. Thus, we anticipate that if model fit is poor, including self-esteem as a 
distinct, latent factor may be necessary to improve model fit indices. After the 
measurement model of the SIBS has been established, the second purpose of 
the study is to test a structural model of the SIBS. 
16 
An Evolutionary Model of Social Anxiety  
and Fears of Evaluation 
 
An evolutionary account of social anxiety provides a theoretical basis for 
the existence of both positive and negative, self- and other- judgmental biases. 
The bivalent fear of evaluation theory of social anxiety (Weeks & Howell, 2012) 
posits that socially anxious individuals fear evaluation in general. Included in this 
model are both fears of negative (FNE) and positive evaluation (FPE). Fear of 
negative evaluation is the fear of being evaluated negatively (Watson & Friend, 
1969), while fear of positive evaluation is proposed to be associated with distress 
over anticipated and received positive evaluation from others (Weeks, Jakatdar, 
& Heimberg, 2010). Although fear of positive and fear of negative evaluation 
moderately correlate together (Weeks & Howell, 2012), fear of positive evaluation 
may be related and yet also distinct from fear of negative evaluation. First, it has 
been proposed that fear of positive evaluation may be a form of delayed fear of 
negative evaluation in that positive evaluation raises SAIs perceived expectations 
that others hold, making it less likely that they will meet these heightened 
expectations, thus ultimately resulting in negative evaluation (Weeks Jakatdar, & 
Heimberg, 2010). Consistent with this account is the finding that, in response to a 
positive social interaction, SAIs experience negative reactions and believe that 
others hold higher social standards for their future behavior (Wallace & Alden, 
1995; Wallace & Alden, 1997).  
Second, however, Weeks, Rodebaugh, Heimberg, Norton, and Jakatdar 
(2009) suggest that positive and fear of negative evaluation can be seen from 
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Gilberts’ (2001) evolutionary perspective of social anxiety. Gilbert’s (2001) 
evolutionary model of social anxiety posits that SAIs contextualize themselves as 
existing in a social hierarchy wherein SAIs perceive themselves as relatively 
inferior and as vulnerable to losing their status in this hierarchy. People inevitably 
compete for the social resources of approval, support and help. Because SAIs 
perceive themselves as being inferior in the social hierarchy, however, they 
revert to certain behavioral mechanisms such as social comparison, 
submissiveness (e.g., eye-gaze avoidance) and self-monitoring (e.g., self-
focused attention), due to their fear of losing social status as well as the fear of 
gaining social status, which would put themselves in a position to compete with 
dominant others for social resources.  
For example, one may fear being viewed as boring (i.e., losing social 
status) because of the risk of being ostracized by others, and also fear being 
viewed as funny (i.e., gaining social status) because of the risk of others social 
reprisal or a perceived inability to defend the heightened social status against 
seemingly dominant others. Therefore, social anxiety arises when individuals 
attempt to acquire or defend social resources (e.g., attempting to attract a 
romantic partner or maintain one’s friends when more dominant others are 
present, respectively) and that such behavioral and psychological mechanisms 
as social comparison, submissiveness, and self-monitoring are used as a means 
to regulate arousal (i.e., anxiety) and avoid threat.  
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Thus, Weeks, Rodebaugh, Heimberg, Norton, and Jakatdar (2009) 
suggest that both fears of evaluation can be seen from the evolutionary model of 
social anxiety in that SAIs are motivated to avoid negative evaluation (i.e., fear 
negative evaluation) for fear of decline in the social hierarchy and resulting 
ostracism, and also to avoid positive evaluation (i.e., fear positive evaluation) for 
fear of advancement in the social hierarchy, leading to possible social reprisal 
due to superseding superior others (Gilbert, 2001). Consistent with the idea that 
fear of positive evaluation is associated with distress and avoidance of upward 
shift in social status, fear of positive evaluation has been negatively associated 
with pride in response to positive feedback. Conversely, consistent with the idea 
that fear of negative evaluation is associated with avoidance of a downward shift 
in social status, fear of negative evaluation has been positively associated with 
pride in response to positive feedback (Reichenberger, Wiggert, Wilhelm, Weeks 
& Blechert, 2015). 
 Moreover, fear of positive and negative evaluation both predict 
submissive behaviors and tendencies to compare oneself unfavorably to others, 
indicating large and small effects, respectively (Weeks, Jakatdar, & Heimberg, 
2010). In addition, SAIs concerns of social reprisal due to positive impressions 
mediated the relationship between fear of positive evaluation and socially 
anxious individuals tendency to discount positive social outcome, suggesting that 
socially anxious individuals may discount positive feedback as a means of 
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reducing anxiety via maintaining an inferior position in the social hierarchy 
(Gilbert, 2001; Weeks & Howell, 2012). 
Additional research indicates that fear of positive evaluation relates 
positively to discomfort in response to positive social feedback, whereas fear of 
negative evaluation is not related to discomfort in response to positive social 
feedback (Weeks, Heimberg, Rodebaugh, & Norton, 2008). However, fear of 
negative evaluation has been associated with increased social evaluative 
concerns, pursuit of approval and avoidance of disapproval (Watson & Friend, 
1969). Moreover, fear of positive evaluation has been shown to account for 
variance in social interaction anxiety above and beyond that of fear of negative 
evaluation, suggesting fear of positive evaluation is a distinct construct (Weeks, 
Heimberg, Rodebaugh & Norton, 2008).  
Confirmatory factor analyses have also indicated that a two factor 
structure of fear of negative and fear of positive evaluation is superior to a single 
factor structure indicating that fear of negative and fear of positive evaluation 
represent related, but distinct constructs (Weeks, Heimberg & Rodebaugh, 2008; 
Weeks, Jakatdar & Heimberg, 2010). This model was cross-validated in another 
independent sample confirming that fear of positive evaluation, fear of negative 
evaluation and also depressive cognitions represent distinct latent factors 
(Weeks, Rodebaugh, Heimberg, Norton & Jakatdar, 2009). Importantly, these 
factors then loaded onto a higher order factor of social anxiety-related 
submissive cognitions. This factor correlated more strongly to measures of social 
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anxiety and social submissiveness than did measures of general anxiety and 
worry. Moreover, fear of negative evaluation and fear of positive evaluation were 
more strongly related to social anxiety than to general anxiety.  
These findings provide support for the evolutionary account of social 
anxiety as existing in a social hierarchy and that fear of positive evaluation, fear 
of negative evaluation and, in certain social contexts, depression can serve the 
purpose of maintaining social harmony and signal submissiveness to other, more 
dominant others (Weeks, Rodebaugh, Heimberg, Norton & Jakatdar, 2009; 
Gilbert, 2001). However, given that fear of positive evaluation is still a relatively 
new construct, further distinguishing fear of positive evaluation as distinct 
construct from fear of negative evaluation is critical. Since these constructs are at 
the core of social anxiety, the second purpose of the current study is to explore 
the differential relationship between probability and cost estimates of positive and 
negative, self- and other-social appraisals and both loci of fear of evaluation. 
 
Temporality of Fears of Evaluation  
and Judgmental Biases 
 
Although several cognitive theories of social anxiety propose that 
anticipatory judgmental biases play a causal or maintaining role in social anxiety 
symptomology (e.g.,Foa & Kozak, 1985, 1986; Clark & Wells, 1995), the 
temporality of judgmental biases and social anxiety is still relatively uncertain. 
That is, do judgmental biases of probability and cost cause social anxiety, 
including fears of positive and negative evaluation, or does social anxiety cause 
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judgmental biases, or is this relationship reciprocal? The research currently 
available to answer this question stems from cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) 
treatment studies. It has long been argued that CBT may exert its influence on 
anxiety reduction through decreases in inflated probability and cost estimates 
(Foa & Kozak, 1986).  
Although a variety of studies (for a review, see Smits, Julian, Rosenfield & 
Powers, 2012) have evaluated judgmental biases as a mediator in the CBT and 
social anxiety reduction relationship and have established that judgmental biases 
are correlated with change in social anxiety symptoms, only a couple have 
examined the temporal relationship between judgmental biases and social 
anxiety symptoms. For instance, past research has revealed that probability and 
cost biases each account for unique variance in participants’ reduced levels of 
self-reported fear (Smits, Rosenfield, McDonald & Telch, 2006).  
Additionally, through repeated measurement of fear and judgmental 
biases throughout treatment, this same study was able to establish temporal 
precedence. Specifically, this study found that reduced probability biases 
predicted self-reported fear, but that this reduced fear then predicted subsequent 
reductions in probability biases, indicating a reciprocal relationship. Reduced cost 
biases were not predictive of reduced fear, instead, reduced fear predicted 
reduced cost biases, suggesting fear precedes biased estimates of cost. 
However, this study measured participants levels of self-reported fear on a 
single-item scale and did not use an established measure of social anxiety as a 
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primary outcome, thus these conclusions of temporality are limited. Nonetheless, 
subsequent research (i.e., Calamaras, Tully, Tone, Price & Anderson, 2015) 
using fear of negative evaluation as the primary outcome has found similar 
results, with probability bias predicting subsequent reduction in fear of negative 
evaluation. In this study, fear of negative evaluation did not predict subsequent 
changes in probability bias, suggesting a non-reciprocal relationship. Cost bias 
was not a significant predictor of change in this study.  
Finally, only one study has evaluated self versus other probability and cost 
estimates in treatment. Results indicated that participants’ probability and cost 
estimates of others (other-related) reactions were more strongly associated with 
social anxiety reduction compared to participants probability and cost estimates 
at the level of the self (self-related) (Taylor & Alden, 2008). This offers additional 
evidence that further delineating self versus others judgmental biases may have 
important treatment implications. However, this study did not control for other-
related judgmental biases, so the extent to which other-judgmental biases 
contributed to unique social anxiety symptom reduction above and beyond self-
judgmental biases is unclear. Additionally it is still uncertain whether other-related 
judgmental biases and self-related judgmental biases constitute distinct 
constructs. In sum, because of the paucity of the research in this area and 
because, to our knowledge, no study has manipulated SAIs appraisals of future 
social outcomes, the causal relationship between social anxiety and judgmental 
biases is relatively uncertain. Therefore, a more comprehensive model of 
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judgmental biases and social anxiety is needed, both for treatment and 
theoretical purposes.  
 
Hypotheses: Evolutionary Basis of Social Anxiety 
 and Social Appraisals 
 
According to the evolutionary theory of social anxiety, fear of negative 
evaluation and positive evaluation are adaptive cognitive mechanisms whereby 
individuals fear and thus avoid decline (i.e., loss of social status) or incline (i.e., 
increase in social status) in the social hierarchy, respectively (Gilbert, 2001). The 
present study seeks to answer the question, how do fears of negative and fears 
of positive evaluation arise and lead to social anxiety?  Fear arises and 
influences behavior, in part, because of anticipated, and perhaps exaggerated, 
threat of future outcomes—it is the anticipatory estimates of future consequences 
that typically have repercussions for what we pursue and what we avoid (e.g., 
“Negative evaluation will be devastating, I must avoid it at all costs,” see, 
Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007). Thusly, it is proposed in the current 
study that fear of positive and negative evaluation stem from exaggerated 
estimates of the impact of anticipated social impressions.  
Specifically, exaggerated appraisals regarding the impact of a negative 
social impression (e.g., “I will look stupid and no one will want to be my friend”) 
may cause a fear of negative evaluation and subsequent social anxiety. That is, 
a fear of decline in the social hierarchy may exist insofar as one believes that a 
negative social impression will result in dramatically negative consequences— 
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this appraisal may be the fundamental basis through which fears of evaluation 
come to fruition and induce social anxiety. Indeed, if one does not anticipate 
inflated negative repercussions of a social impression there would likely be 
nothing to fear. Thus, it is proposed that exaggerated anticipatory social 
appraisals (self-related and other-related) of conveying a negative, undesirable 
impression will positively predict fear of negative evaluation (Hypothesis 1a).  
It is expected that overestimates of the impact of positive social 
impressions may also result in fear of negative evaluation. Fear of negative 
evaluation has been associated with a fear of social reprisal due to positive social 
impressions (Weeks & Howell, 2012). Because socially anxious individuals 
perceive themselves to exist low in social rank in the social hierarchy, a socially 
anxious individual may exaggerate the expected consequences of conveying a 
positive impression because this may enable them to avoid further decline in the 
social hierarchy (e.g., “I will look smart and gain valuable support from friends;” 
avoid ostracism and further loss of already perceived deficient social resources). 
However, the greater the social impact that an individual anticipates a positive 
social impression to have, the greater the extent of the upshift in the social 
hierarchy. This inflated upshift has the repercussion, however, of greater social 
competition, and, crucially, socially anxious individuals may perceive themselves 
as incapable of defending social gains (Gilbert, 2001), this may induce greater 
fear of negative evaluation.  
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As positive impressions may lead to perceived upshifts in the social 
hierarchy, an exaggerated expectation about the impact of positive social 
impressions may lead to exaggerated anticipated shifts in the social hierarchy, 
and thusly increased fears of negative evaluation. Therefore, it is proposed that 
another mechanism that fear of negative evaluation may stem from is through 
exaggerated estimates of the impact of positive social impressions—that is, an 
underlying overestimated upward shift in the social hierarchy (e.g. “If I speak 
articulately, I will look very smart and it will increase my sense of social status, 
but I cannot compete and I will thus be viewed unfavorably”). Therefore, it is 
expected that anticipatory appraisals (self-related and other-related) of conveying 
a positive, desirable impression will also positively predict fear of negative 
evaluation (Hypothesis 1b). It is unclear if participants’ appraisals of positive, 
desirable impressions will be predictive of fear of positive evaluation. Because 
fear of positive evaluation has been associated with distress in reaction to 
positive feedback as well as tendencies to discount positive feedback (Weeks & 
Howell, 2012), no a priori hypotheses are stated for this relationship. It is, 
however, proposed that negative appraisals will be predictive of fear of positive 
evaluation.  
Previous research has indicated that SAIs may fear positive evaluation 
due to subsequent negative social impressions.  Socially anxious individuals may 
anticipate social impressions to bring heightened, and thereby unreachable, 
expectations, and thus anticipate resulting negative social impressions.(e.g., 
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Wallace & Alden, 1997). According to evolutionary theory, this may have had the 
benefit of impelling individuals to avoid anticipated upshifts in the social hierarchy 
by overestimating the perceived danger of the competitive consequences of such 
upshifts. It is thusly posited that fear of positive evaluation may exist insofar as 
participants overestimate the impact of negative social impressions. Therefore it 
is expected that anticipated social appraisals (self-related and other-related) of 
conveying a negative social impression will positively predict fear of positive 
evaluation (hypothesis 1c).  
The current study implemented a structural equation model (SEM) 
approach to assess the association between judgmental biases and social 
anxiety constructs (i.e., trait social anxiety, fear of positive and fear of negative 
evaluation). Two competing SEM models were tested (hypothesis 2). That is, one 
in which social appraisals act as a predictor of social anxiety, with fears of 
evaluation as a mediator. This model is presented in Figure 2. Conversely, one in 
which fears of evaluation act as a predictor of social anxiety, with social 
appraisals as a mediator. This model is presented in Figure 1.  
In addition, I argue that in order to have a comprehensive model of social 
appraisals, individuals’ estimates of the impact of social impressions on others 
(other-related social appraisals) need to be included. Thus, other-related 
appraisals were examined as a distinct construct and predictor, or outcome, of 
fears of evaluation compared to self-related social appraisals (hypothesis 3). 
Finally, although previous research (i.e., Trew & Alden, 2009) has shown that 
27 
social anxiety and depression do not interact in their prediction of negative social 
appraisals, it is unclear how depression may affect positive social appraisals. 
Thus, depression will be statistically controlled for in the present study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were students from California State University San 
Bernardino social science classes, who participated to receive extra credit. 
Seven participants were deleted for indicating that they did not respond to the 
questionnaires honestly, 39 participants were deleted for a completion time of 
less than 15 minutes, 65 were deleted for failing the random response check 
items, five participants were deleted for response times over 500 minutes. The 
Mahalanobis distance test was used to determine multivariate outliers. 
Mahalanobis distance determines an outlier by assessing the distance of a given 
score from the center of the data (Mahalanobis, 1936). A larger distance 
suggests that the case is an outlier. Mahalanobis distance follows a chi-square 
distribution and thus multivariate cases can be identified by their magnitude and 
significance. Multivariate values that fell below 0.1% were removed. Thus, 33 
multivariate outliers (Mahalanobis d-squared > 34, p < .001) were identified and 
deleted.  
The final sample consisted of 474 participants (male = 307; female = 167) 
with ages ranging from 17 to 65 (M = 22.39; SD = 5.52). The ethnic composition 
of the sample was 6.5% Asian American, 0.4% American Indian, 5.3% African 
American, 65.4% Hispanic/Latino, 1.5% Pacific Islander, 16% White, and 4.9% 
Other. Sixty-four percent of students reported that their yearly income ranged 
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from $0 to $15,000, 18% reported a yearly income between $15,000 and 
$30,000, with the remaining participants reporting incomes of $30,000 or greater. 
For their parent or caretakers highest level of education completed, 24% of 
participants reported some college, 22% reported a high school diploma, 17% a 
college degree, 12% some high school, 10% reported grade school and 7% 
reported a post-graduate degree. 
To rule out confounding results stemming from gender differences, we 
also examined the social anxiety related variables separately for males and 
females. Females (M = 19.60; SD = 7.75) and males (M = 20.80, SD = 8.32) 
scored equally on measures of fear negative evaluation, t(472) = 1.53, p = .128, 
these levels of FNE are similar to established norms in a sample of multiracial 
students and slightly above community samples (Rodebaugh et al., 2011). 
Moreover, genders scored equally on measures of fear of positive evaluation, 
with female (M = 26.54, SD = 14.15) and male (M = 27.52, SD = 15.17) mean 
differences being nonsignificant, t(472) = .688, p = .492. Genders also scored 
equally on measures of social interaction anxiety with female (M = 19.55, SD = 
13.73) and male (M = 19.65, SD = 13.92) participants mean differences, t(472) = 
.071, p = .944, being nonsignificant as well. Therefore, male and female 
participants were analyzed simultaneously. Mean social anxiety in this present 
sample is slightly above community sample norms and similar to student sample 
norms (Rodebaugh et al., 2011). . 
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Procedure 
Surveys were distributed through the use of Qualtrics, an online survey 
editorial system. Participants accessed the study through SONA, an online 
department research management system, and completed the surveys from 
personal or lab computers at their convenience. No names or other identifying 
information were recorded. Each participant received the SIBS first, this was 
done to reduce the carry over effects from the other social anxiety related 
measures in the survey flow (i.e., FPE, FNE, and SIAS). Participants received 
the subsequent surveys in a random order, with the exception of the 
demographic information form, which participants always received last. 
Measures 
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale  
The Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995) was used to control for depression, anxiety and stress. The 
DASS-21 was chosen for it is ability to measure several divergent constructs in a 
succinct manner—each subscale of depression, anxiety and stress contains 
seven items. Participants report symptoms experienced over the course of the 
previous week on a 0 (Did not apply to me at all) to 3 (Applied to me very much, 
or most of the time) Likert scale. The DASS-21 has Cronbach’s alpha coefficients 
ranging from .87 to .94, has been shown to correlate strongly with other 
established measures of depression and anxiety and has exhibited an excellent 
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factor structure in clinical samples (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 
1998). 
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale—Straightforward Score  
The 20-item Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) measures fears of 
general social interaction and discriminates between social anxiety and other 
anxiety disorders (Mattick & Clarke, 1998). Participants are asked to respond on 
a 5-point Likert type scale ranging from 0 (not at all characteristic or true of me) 
to 4 (extremely characteristic or true of me). The SIAS-S has been found to have 
excellent internal consistency in undergraduate samples with a Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient of .93 (Rodebaugh, Woods & Heimberg, 2007). The reverse-scored 
items have been shown to compromise the factor structure of the SIAS and show 
weaker relationships to convergent measures compared to the straightforwardly 
worded items. Thus removing the reverse-scored items has been shown to 
improve the construct and factorial validity of the scale (Rodebaugh, Woods & 
Heimberg, 2007). Moreover, previous research indicates that the SIAS reverse-
scored items may be moderated by higher age and lower education and thus 
comprise the validity of the scale (Rodebaugh, Heimberg, Brown, Fernandez, 
Blanco, Schneier, & Liebowitz, 2011). Therefore, only the 17 straightforward 
items of the SIAS (SIAS-S) will be used to calculate total scores.  
Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale—Straightforward Score  
The Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Leary, 1983) is a truncated 
version of the original 30-item FNE (Watson & Friend, 1969). The BFNE consists 
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of 12-items measuring a core component of social anxiety, fear of negative 
evaluation. Using a five-point Likert scale (0 [not at all characteristic of me] to 4 
[extremely characteristic of me]). Similar to the SIAS, however, the BFNE has 
revealed a 2-factor structure with the reverse-worded and straightforwardly 
worded items loading on separate dimensions, and weaker convergent validity 
for the reverse-worded items relative to the straightforwardly-worded items 
(Weeks et al., 2005; Rodebaugh, Woods, Thissen, Heimberg, Chabless, & 
Rapee, 2004; Carleton, McCeary, Norton & Asmundson, 2006). Thus, the 
straightforwardly worded items and the reverse-worded items were given but only 
the eight straightforwardly worded items (BFNE-S) were used to calculate total 
scores. The BFNE-S has demonstrated excellent internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alphas > .92) in undergraduate samples and clinical samples 
(Rodebaugh et al., 2004; Weeks et al., 2005). 
Fear of Positive Evaluation Scale  
The Fear of Positive Evaluation Scale (FPES; Weeks, Heimberg, & 
Rodebaugh, 2008) is a 10-item measure using a 10-point Likert scale (0 [Not at 
all true] to 9 [Very True]) that measures apprehension and distress associated 
with positive evaluation and demonstrated strong internal consistency in an 
undergraduate sample (Cronbach’s alpha = .80), good test-retest reliability, have 
been found to comprise a single latent factor and has demonstrated support for 
discriminant and convergent validity (Weeks, Heimberg & Rodebaugh, 2008). 
Participants are asked to respond to the statements as though they are relevant 
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to people they do not know very well to control familiarity biases. Sample items 
include “I feel uneasy when I receive praise from authority figures” and “I 
generally feel uncomfortable when people give me compliments.” The FPE scale 
contains two reverse coded items that are not used in the calculation of total 
scale scores. The FPES has been shown to be related, but distinct to FNE. 
Social Impact Bias Scale  
The Social Impact Bias Scale (SIBS; Johns & Lewin, unpublished) is a 
novel measure created for the purposes of measuring socially anxious 
individuals' probability and cost estimates of anticipated unambiguous positive 
and negative social events. To make the anticipation of conveying a desired or 
undesired impression salient, each social scenario entailed a response ending 
with an adjective from the other person(s) in the scenario, thus eliminating 
ambiguity (e.g., “As you are talking to a person you have just met, an interesting 
personal event comes to mind and you tell them about it. The person smiles and 
responds with “Wow, you seem really interesting”). After reading the scenario, 
participants were asked to rate the extent to which they, themselves, would feel 
this way if this were to happen, using the same adjective that came from the 
person(s) in the scenario (i.e., “If this were to happen, rate the degree to which 
you would feel that you are interesting”). Consistent with Gilboa-Schectman et 
al., we also emphasized that participants imagine and anticipate such a scenario, 
even if they thought it was unlikely or felt uncertain about it. 
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The same design was used to assess participants’ probability and costs of 
others perceptions, except, after reading the scenario, participants were asked to 
rate the degree to which other person(s) in the scenario perceived the participant 
on that adjective (i.e., “If this were to happen, rate the degree to which this 
person would feel that you are _____, e.g., interesting”). Conversely, negative 
social scenarios were constructed in a manner that was identical to the positive 
scenarios, but was different in the outcome in that individuals did not receive the 
desired response from the other person(s) in the scenario. The negative 
scenarios also did not end in a negative adjective as it was determined that this 
would make the scenarios unrealistic. Thus, the scenarios ended in a more likely 
negatively conveyed impression (e.g., “As you are talking to a person you have 
just met, an interesting personal event comes to mind and you tell them about it. 
The person frowns and responds with “is that supposed to be interesting?”). As 
opposed to an outright negative reaction (e.g., the person says “you’re boring”).  
However, similar to the positive scenarios, participants did rate their 
responses based on the relevant adjective (e.g., “If this were to happen, rate the 
extent to which you would feel that you are boring”). These adjectives were 
chosen because they represented the opposite of the positive adjectives (e.g., 
interesting vs boring). Like the positive scenarios, participants also responded to 
an other-subscale for the negative scenarios. As an attempt to replicate Gilboa-
Schectman et al., the only study to find anticipated positive judgmental biases 
among SAIs, we included the same subscales of probability, magnitude, 
35 
duration, physical reaction, and self-esteem for each scenario as measures of 
probability and impact. Thus the SIBS consists of 20 social scenarios (i.e., 5 self-
positive scenarios [SP], 5 other-positive scenarios [OP]; 5 self-negative scenarios  
[SN], and 5 other-negative scenarios [ON]) each scenario included subscales of  
anticipated probability, magnitude, duration, physical arousal, and self-esteem of 
the corresponding scenario to measure respondents estimated social impact. 
Each social scenario was matched closely in terms of content and wording. The 
SIBS can be found in Appendix C. 
Design 
The current study employed a non-experimental design. Fears of 
negative/positive evaluation were tested as predictors of social anxiety with 
appraisals as a mediators. Alternatively, appraisals were tested as predictors of 
social anxiety with of fears of negative/positive evaluation as mediators.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESULTS 
Analysis Strategy 
We used SPSS AMOS to test the hypothesized model presented in Figure 
1. To statistically control for depression, we regressed depression on the 
measures fear of negative evaluation, fear of positive evaluation, and social 
interaction anxiety to obtain unstandardized residuals. The unstandardized 
residuals were used in model analysis. The subscales of the SIBS for each 
dimension of social impact biases (i.e., self-positive and negative, other-positive 
and negative) were parceled by summing each subscale of the SIBS dimension 
and using the sum of the dimensions respective subscales as indicators. The use 
of parcels has several advantages. Most relevant is the parsimonious use of 
subscales as indicators (Little, Cunningham, Shahar & Widaman, 2002). The use 
of parceling reduces the overall parameters in the current model dramatically, 
resulting in a much more parsimonious model. This is done in particular because 
as mentioned the purpose of the current model is the measurement of the 
relevant construct (i.e., social appraisals) and not the individual items. 
Because the interest of the present study is on the development of the 
construct, social appraisals, and not the development of a scale, the relevance of 
what each individual item is measuring is not as important as capturing the 
construct. That is, the purpose of the current study is not scale construction but 
comprehensive measurement of the relevant construct. Moreover, parceling has 
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the potential to reduce sampling error, improve the stability of the solution, 
resulting in smaller standard errors and more stable estimates of parameters 
(Little, Cunningham, Shahar & Widaman, 2002). Cronbach’s alpha was used to 
assess the internal consistency of the questionnaires before SEM analysis. For 
consistency, participants replied to the self-esteem subscale for both the self-
related and other-related dimension of the SIBS, but the other-related self-
esteem subscale was not used in statistical analyses for lack of theoretical 
justification.  
Psychometric Properties of the Social Impact Bias Scale 
A reliability analysis revealed that removal of the physical arousal 
subscale was necessary in order to improve the overall internal consistency of 
the latent factors. Table 1 shows the final model’s internal consistency for each of 
the SIBS dimensions. As indicated in Table 1, after removal of the physical 
arousal subscale, each of the SIBS dimensions demonstrated excellent internal 
consistency (all Cronbach’s alphas > .90). However, for the purposes of testing 
probability as a distinct measured variable, the physical arousal subscale was 
retained in initial model analysis, because although it resulted in reduced internal 
consistency (SN = .84 versus .90; ON = .70 versus .81; SP = .78 versus .80; OP 
= .62 versus .70), this reduction was minimal and this subscale’s presence was 
necessary as the deletion of this subscale would leave the other-appraisal 
domains with two indicators and a minimum of three indicators are needed for 
each latent factor. It is important to note that because of the present study’s use 
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of parceling, latent variable alphas could be based on the summation of 
subscales (i.e., adding the sum of responses on magnitude, probability, and 
duration) or on the summation of individual items (i.e., the sum of item-level 
responses to each of the social scenarios on each of the subscales). Latent 
variable alphas reported in Table 1 are based on item-level responses. The use 
of scale-level alphas are nearly identical. 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study Variables.  
Variable  Mean (SD)    Scale alpha   Correlations 
          1         2         3        4        5        6          
1. SIAS-S  19.61 (13.84)      .94  1.00 
2. BFNE-S  20.37 (8.14)      .93   .52**  1.00 
3. FPE   27.18 (14.81)      .83     .38**   .10**  1.00  
4. Self-Negative 74.35 (40.03)          .93   .30**   .35*    .29**  1.00 
5. Other-Negative 61.65 (25.18)          .94      .22**   .29**  .21**   .68**  1.00 
6. Self-Positive  114.34 (26.35)        .95   .08      .11*    .07**  .21**  .31**  1.00 
7. Other-Positive 76.39 (21.20)      .94     .06      .03      .05*   .16**  .34**   .79**    
 
  Note:   * p < .05, **p < .001. Correlations shown in table are after statistically 
controlling for depression.  
 
 
 
Table 2 delineates the reliability of the subscales for each dimension of 
the SIBS.  A reliability analysis revealed that the subscales of the self-positive 
dimension demonstrated good internal consistency (each Cronbach’s alpha > 
.80). The self-esteem subscale of the self-negative dimension demonstrated 
good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .85). The remaining subscales on 
the self-negative dimension revealed adequate to good internal consistency 
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(Cronbach’s alphas > .77). Reliability analyses for the other-negative domain 
revealed good internal consistency for each subscale (Cronbach’s alphas > .83), 
similar findings arose with the other-positive domain with each subscale 
indicating good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alphas > . 86). No removal of 
SIBS questionnaire items would improve internal consistency. The SIAS, BFNE, 
and FPE each demonstrated good to excellent internal consistency.  
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Subscales of the Social Impact Bias Scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scale                          No. of 
items 
M (SD) Alpha 
Other-Negative    
    Magnitude 5 17.59 (7.10)     .83 
    Probability   5 17.54 (7.30)     .85 
    Duration 5 12.40 (7.82)     .86 
Other-Positive    
    Magnitude 5 17.43 (4.20)     .89 
    Probability 5 23.23 (5.70)     .88 
    Duration 5 12.44 (6.00)     .86 
Self-Negative    
    Magnitude 5 15.30 (8.67)     .78 
    Probability 5 15.46 (8.80)     .79 
    Duration 5 11.80 (8.20)     .77 
    Self-esteem 5 17.20 (8.72)     .85 
Self-Positive    
    Magnitude 5 30.20 (6.82)     .90 
    Probability 5 30.33 (7.00)     .90 
    Duration 5 21.26 (9.77)     .92 
    Self-esteem 5 32.55 (7.13)     .84 
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Structural Model 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) was implemented using SPSS 
AMOS. Based upon the current study’s medium to large sample size and the 
acceptable assumptions of normality and independence, Maximum Likelihood 
(ML) was used for model estimation (Hu, Bentler, & Kano, 1992). Model fit was 
assessed utilizing the Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler, 1988) with values of 
.95 or higher suggesting good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999); the Standardized Root 
Mean Square Residual (SRMR; Hu & Bentler, 1999), values of .08 or less being 
indicative of a good fitting model; the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA; Browne & Cudeck, 1993), values of RMSEA that are .06 or less 
suggest a good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999), whereas values .10 or higher suggest a 
model that fits the data poorly (Browne & Cudeck, 1993).  
The initial model consisted of latent factors of self-positive (indicators of 
magnitude, duration, self-esteem, and physical arousal), other-positive 
(indicators of magnitude, duration, physical arousal), self-negative (indicators of 
magnitude, duration, self-esteem and physical arousal) and other-negative 
(indicators of magnitude, duration, and physical arousal). The probability 
subscale was implemented as a distinct, measured variable. This model is 
presented in Figure 1. This initial model indicated a poor fit, χ2(168, N = 474) = 
6103.22, RMSEA = .256 [.249, .264]; CFI =.38; GFI = .56, SRMR = .26. 
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Figure 1. The Hypothesized Model.  
Note: For indicators, M = Magnitude, D = Duration, SE = Self-esteem, Ph = Physical 
arousal. For factors, SP = Self-positive, OP = Other-positive, SN = Self-negative, ON = Other-
negative, SP-P = Self-positive probability, OP-P = Other-positive probability, SN-P = Self-
negative probability, ON-P = Other-negative probability. 
 
 
Evaluation of modification indices suggested that probability was not a 
distinct latent factor. Thus, consistent with literature indicating that probability and 
magnitude are highly correlated (e.g., Foe et al., 1996), and therefore not distinct, 
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probability was used as an indicator of the latent factors. Because previous 
reliability analyses revealed that removal of the physical arousal subscale would 
improve the internal consistency of the SIBS domains, we replaced the physical 
arousal subscale with the probability subscale as an indicator of SIBS social 
appraisal domains. Further modification indices revealed that correlated 
measurement error was necessary to improve model fit. This correlated 
measurement error is expected since the subscales of each reaction entail a 
shared method component (Brown 2015). Specifically, each subscale of every 
social scenario assesses the same construct (i.e., anticipatory social appraisals), 
with similar wording, using the same or similar social scenarios under the same 
method (i.e., questionnaire); thus the presence correlated measurement error is 
theoretically justified. Since the specific subscales of each scenario and 
dimension of the SIBS were presented in randomized order, neither correlations 
are assumed to be causal in nature (Brown, 2015).  
The final model consisted of four distinct latent factors of self-positive 
(indicators of magnitude, probability, duration and self-esteem), other-positive 
(indicators of magnitude, probability, duration), self-negative (indicators of 
magnitude, probability, duration and self-esteem), and other-negative (indicators 
of magnitude, probability, and duration). The final model yielded a good fit (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999), χ2(94, N = 474) = 173.80, RMSEA = .042 [.032, .052]; CFI =.99; 
GFI = .96; SRMR = .04. Moreover, the 90% CIs of the RMSEA included values 
less than .06. This final model is presented in Figure 2. 
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     Figure 2. The Final Model.  
     Note: *p < .05, **p < .001. For indicators, M = Magnitude, D = Duration, SE = Self-esteem, P = 
Probability. For factors, SP = Self-positive, OP = Other-positive, SN = Self-negative, ON = Other-
negative. Standardized coefficients are displayed. 
 
 
As Table 3 shows, factor loadings revealed that all indicators loaded 
strongly on their respective latent factors. Standardized factor loadings ranged 
from .60 to .98 and were all significant at the p = .001 level. To further examine 
the importance of each indicator, we examined the amount of variance that each 
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latent factor accounted for in their respective indicators. The self-negative latent 
factor accounted for the most amount of variance in the probability indicator 
subscale (97%), followed by the magnitude subscale (95%), the duration 
subscale (70%), and the self-esteem subscale (58%). The other-negative latent 
factor accounted for the most amount of variance in the probability subscale 
(96%), followed by the magnitude subscale (95%), and the duration subscale 
(50%). The self-positive latent factor accounted for the most amount of variance 
in the magnitude subscale (96%), followed by the probability subscale (95%), the 
self-esteem subscale (58%) and the duration subscale (36%). The other-positive 
latent factor accounted for the most amount of variance in the probability 
subscale (95%), followed by the magnitude subscale (93%), and the duration 
subscale (38%). These findings suggest that across all latent factors, the 
magnitude and probability indicators may represent the “core” (see, Little, 
Cunningham, Shahar & Widaman, 2002) of social appraisals with duration and 
self-esteem playing an important but less critical role in anticipatory social 
appraisals. 
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Table 3. Factor Loadings of the Social Impact Bias Scale. 
Factor Standardized loading 
Self-negative 
   Magnitude 
 
.98 
   Duration .84 
   Probability .98 
   Self-esteem .76 
Other-negative 
   Magnitude 
 
.97 
   Duration 
   Probability 
Self-positive 
   Magnitude 
   Duration 
   Probability 
   Self-esteem 
Other-positive 
   Magnitude 
   Duration 
   Probability 
.84 
.98 
 
.98 
.60 
.97 
.76 
 
.97 
.62 
.97 
  
Note: All factors loadings p < .001. 
 
 
Testing of Hypotheses 
To test the present study’s specific hypotheses, we examined the 
association between the latent factors of the SIBS and fears of evaluation. Bias 
corrected (BCa) bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 10000 samples 
were used to determine the significance of coefficients. Consistent with the 
expectations of hypothesis 1a, self-negative anticipatory appraisals were 
positively associated with fear of negative evaluation (standardized coefficient = 
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.25, p < .001); other-negative anticipatory appraisals were positively associated 
with fear of negative evaluation as well (standardized coefficient = .14, p = .036). 
Consistent with expectations of hypothesis 1c, self-negative appraisals were 
positively associated with fear of positive evaluation (standardized coefficient = 
.28, p < .001). However, inconsistent with expectations of hypothesis 1c, other-
negative appraisals were associated with fear of positive evaluation 
(standardized coefficient = .03, p = .641). This suggests that other-negative 
appraisals may have the potential to differentiate fears of negative from fears of 
positive evaluation. 
Consistent with expectations of hypothesis 1b, self-positive anticipatory 
appraisals were associated with fear of negative evaluation (standardized 
coefficient = .17, p = .023), representing a small to moderate effect. However, 
unexpectedly, other-positive anticipatory appraisals were negatively associated 
with fear of negative evaluation (standardized coefficient = -.19, p = .012). 
Consistent with expectations, inclusion of self-positive (standardized coefficient = 
.06, p = .448) and other-positive (standardized coefficient = -.12, p = .108) paths 
to fear of positive evaluation did not improve model fit χ2(92, N = 474) = 170.97, 
RMSEA = .043 [.033, .052]; CFI = .99; GFI = .96; SRMR = .03 and standardized 
coefficients for these paths were small and insignificant, suggesting that positive 
anticipatory social appraisals may distinguish fear of negative from fear of 
positive evaluation. However, hypothesis 2 in which this model is compared to an 
alternative, competing model wherein anticipatory social appraisals are tested as 
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a mediator in the fears of evaluation—social anxiety relationship could not be 
tested utilizing the present study’s methodology. The relative strength of model fit 
indices of statistically equivalent models cannot be used to determine the validity 
of the models. This is because it is possible for model fit indices of an incorrect 
model that are statistically equivalent to have a model fit indices (Keith, 2014).   
To test hypothesis 3 and examine the construct validity of the SIBS, we 
tested the distinctness of the other-appraisals from the self-appraisals by loading 
other-appraisal indicators for the other-negative and other-positive latent factors 
onto their respective self-negative and self-positive latent factors (i.e., a two-
factor model of the SIBS). Poor model fit of this two-factor model of the SIBS, 
relative to the four-factor model in which both self- and other- appraisals are 
distinct, would support the notion that both self- and other-appraisals are distinct 
and thus necessary to measure. Results supported the latter, the two-factor 
model yielded a poor model fit, χ2(104, N = 474) = 2094.30, RMSEA = .201 [.194, 
.209]; CFI =.77; GFI = .70, SRMR = .09. That is, in support of hypothesis 3, the 
four-factor model in which self- and other-appraisals were modeled as distinct 
factors revealed a far superior fit to the data relative to the two-factor model, 
suggesting that both self- and other-appraisals are distinct. Table 4 summarizes 
the comparison of fit indices of the models used in the current study. 
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Table 4. Comparison of Fit Indices Among Competing Models. 
Model χ2 df CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Final 
Initial 
173.80 
6103.22 
94 
168 
.99 
.38 
.042 
.256 
.04 
.26 
Two factor 2094.30 104 .77 .201 .09 
Paths to FPE 170.97 92 .99 .043 .03 
      
 
 
Indirect Effects 
The findings of the indirect effects of anticipatory social appraisals on 
social anxiety through fears of evaluation were examined. Indirect effects may 
further lend evidence for the construct validity of the SIBS. Results revealed that 
with the exception of other-negative anticipatory social appraisals (standardized 
indirect effect = .07, p = .074), anticipatory social appraisals may influence social 
anxiety indirectly through fears of positive and negative evaluation (standardized 
indirect effects for self-negative = .21, p < .001; self-positive = .08, p = .021; 
other-positive = -.09, p = .009). All direct paths from SIBS factors to the SIAS 
were small and insignificant, all ps > .18, as shown in Figure 2. 
Discriminant Validity of the Social Impact Bias Scale 
Finally, it is possible that self and other, positive and negative social 
appraisals are associated with fears of evaluations due to anxiety, depression, or 
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stress. To rule this out, we assessed the discriminate validity of the SIBS; that is, 
whether the SIBS dimensions are specific to social anxiety or variables known to 
be related to social anxiety and social appraisals (i.e., stress, anxiety, and 
depression). High correlation between these variables and the SIBS would 
suggest poor discriminant validity. After statistically controlling for depression, the 
subscales of the SIBS did not correlate with stress or general anxiety (all rs < .07; 
all ps > .16), suggesting that depression is responsible for the subsequently 
reported relationships between the SIBS and general anxiety and stress.  
However, because depression and anxiety are highly correlated, we 
examined the relationship between the SIBS and third variables controlling for 
anxiety and stress. After statistically controlling for anxiety, depression was 
negatively correlated with self-positive appraisals (r = -.10, p = .024), 
uncorrelated with other-positive appraisals (r = -.03, p =.52), positively correlated 
with other-negative (r = .14, p =.002) and positively correlated with self-negative 
appraisals (r =.213, p < .001). Stress was positively correlated with other-
negative (r = .10, p =.03) and self-negative appraisals (r = .13, p = .006), but not 
positive appraisals (rs < .03). After statistically controlling for stress, a similar 
pattern emerged. Depression was correlated with self- (r = .10, p = .006), and 
other- (r = .13, p = < .001) negative appraisals and self-positive appraisals  
(r = -.11, p = .016), but not other-positive appraisals. Anxiety was only correlated 
with self-negative appraisals (r = .11, p = .018; all other ps > .09).  Because 
stress and anxiety did not correlate with the SIBS when depression was 
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statistically controlled for, but correlated with the other DASS subscales when 
only anxiety or stress was controlled for, this pattern of results suggests that the 
small correlation between the SIBS and stress and anxiety may be attributed to 
depression. These findings lend evidence for the discriminant validity of the SIBS 
and further support for the appropriateness of statistically controlling for 
depression in the present study 
 
 
 
 
 51 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
DISCUSSION 
 
Research examining socially anxious individuals (SAIs) negative, self-
relevant anticipatory social appraisals is abundant (e.g., Foa et al, 1996; Gilboa-
Schechtman, et al., 2000; Bielak & Moscovitch, 2013). It is unambiguously clear 
that SAIs overestimate the impact that a negatively conveyed social impression 
would bring to their sense of self. But do such unidimensional appraisals fully 
capture SAIs social appraisals? In the current study, we utilized SEM to develop 
and examine a more comprehensive model of SAIs social appraisals, assessing 
other-negative (impact of negative social impressions on others), self-positive 
(anticipated impact of positive social impression on oneself), and other-positive 
(anticipated impact of positive social impression on others) in addition to self-
negative appraisals. After theoretically justified adjustments, findings generally 
supported the hypothesized model. At the latent level, consistent with 
expectations and supporting past research, self-negative social appraisals were 
positively associated with fear of negative evaluation and fear of positive 
evaluation.  
Also consistent with expectations and adding to past research, other-
negative social appraisals were positively associated with fear of negative 
evaluation; inconsistent with expectations, however, other-negative appraisals 
were unrelated to fear of positive evaluation. Moreover, these other-negative 
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appraisals were not indirectly related to social anxiety through fears of 
evaluation. Consistent with expectations and further adding to the social 
appraisal (or judgement bias) and social anxiety literature, self-positive social 
appraisals were positively associated with fear of negative evaluation, 
contributed to increased social anxiety indirectly through fear of negative 
evaluation, but were unrelated to fear of positive evaluation. Interestingly, 
inconsistent with expectations, other-positive social appraisals were not 
associated positively, but negatively with fear of negative evaluation, and led to 
social anxiety indirectly through fear of negative evaluation. Thus SAIs may not 
only anticipate that they, themselves, will respond negatively to a social mishap, 
but that others will respond nearly as negatively. Perhaps paradoxically, SAIs 
may also anticipate an increased impact of a conveyed positive social impression 
on themselves, but less of this impact on others impressions.  
Discussion of Findings 
What explains the apparent contradictory finding that increased self-
positive appraisals are predictive of increased fear of negative evaluation, but 
that other-positive appraisals are predictive of decreased fear of negative 
evaluation? According to the anchoring and adjustment hypothesis (Gilovich, 
Medvec & Savitsky, 2000), individuals anchor on their own positive appraisal of 
themselves, adjust, and extrapolate from their own experience what others will 
experience. In support of the anchoring and adjustment hypothesis, self-positive 
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and other-positive appraisals are both positively and highly correlated. From this 
view, we would expect that if increased self-positive appraisals predict increased 
fear of negative evaluation, then increased other-positive appraisals would also 
predict increased fear of negative evaluation. Thus, if SAIs were anchoring and 
adjusting according to their own internal state, we would expect decreased fear 
of negative evaluation among SAIs; of course, this is not the case. It may well be 
that SAIs do not rely on their own experience, but instead their beliefs about 
others; in contrast, non-SAIs may rely on their own internal state to infer and 
anticipate what others may think. 
Therefore, one partial explanation for how fear of negative evaluation may 
develop is through decreased reliance on one’s own positive internal states when 
in anticipation of conveying a positive impression. Social anxiety may develop 
when individuals rely on preexisting beliefs that others are hypercritical or that 
others have exaggerated social standards (e.g., Wallace & Alden, 1991; 
Schlenker & Leary, 1982; Clark & Wells, 1995), which may lead to decreased 
anticipated positive social appraisals from others and thus fear of negative 
evaluation.  This supports theoretical perspectives that suggests that social 
anxiety is a disorder comprised of distorted perceptions of others’ perceptions 
(Gilbert, 2001), and that social anxiety is associated with impairments in theory of 
mind such that SAIs exaggeratedly read into others’ mental states (Washburn, 
Wilson, Roes, Rnic & Harkness, 2016). On the other hand, an increased reliance 
on one’s own internal states to infer others positive reactions may lead to 
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reductions in fear of negative evaluation and thus decreased social anxiety. This 
view is supported by previous research indicating that SAI’s self-worth is 
contingent upon others’ perceptions and that reductions in contingent self-worth 
is related to reductions in social anxiety (Taylor & Alden, 2008).  
Although within valence self-related and other-related anticipatory social 
appraisals were highly correlated in the present study, this high correlation is 
expected. Socially anxious individuals have been shown to base their sense of 
self on their appraisals of others responses (Taylor & Alden, 2008). This 
contingent self-worth may result in SAIs basing self-negative and self-positive 
estimates of social impact in anticipation of others responses, which may have 
led to overlap among the self-related and other-related social appraisals. 
Nonetheless, a two-factor model in which self and other dimensions of the SIBS 
loaded on a single factor within their respective valence (i.e. positive and 
negative), resulted in a much poorer model fit relative to a four-factor model in 
which self-related and other-related, positive and negative dimensions of the 
SIBS loaded onto distinct factors.  
Moreover, whereas self-negative appraisals were positively associated 
with both fear of positive and negative evaluation, other-negative appraisals were 
only associated with fear of negative evaluation. Whereas, self-positive 
appraisals were positively associated with fear of negative evaluation, other-
positive appraisals were negatively associated with fear of negative evaluation 
and positive social appraisals were not associated with fear of positive 
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evaluation. These findings, although preliminary, suggest that measuring self-
positive, other-positive, and other-negative social appraisals may add 
incremental validity in the prediction of fears of evaluation and social anxiety 
beyond the assessment of mere self-negative social appraisals. 
The present findings support the evolutionary account of social anxiety—
fear of positive and negative evaluation may arise when individuals overestimate 
consequences of social impressions (i.e., exaggerated upward and downward 
shifts in the social hierarchy). The present study suggests that individuals with 
social anxiety may anticipate that a positive impression will bring increased social 
status for themselves, but that this upshift in social rank may also put them in the 
position to compete with others. However, socially anxious individuals view 
themselves as unable to compete and defend social resources, this then results 
in fear of negative evaluation and subsequent social anxiety (Gilbert, 2001). 
Indeed, previous research has shown that fear of negative evaluation is 
associated with concerns of social reprisal from conveying a positive impression 
(Weeks & Howell, 2012).  
In this sense, socially anxious individuals may fear negative evaluation 
because of an overestimation of rise in social status—that a positive impression 
would increase their social status to an inflated extent which increases the 
socially anxious individuals’ perception that they are in competition with dominant 
others and fear of negative evaluation thusly ensues. This is supported by the 
present study’s findings that anticipated positive reaction from others is 
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negatively associated with fear of negative evaluation. That is, self-positive and 
other-positive social appraisals may be associated in the opposite directions with 
fear of negative evaluation because the extent to which a positive impression has 
an impact on oneself (i.e., the increase in one’s social status; “I will look smart 
and feel good about it, but I cannot defend this social image”), the less of a 
positive impact it will have on others (e.g., a higher likelihood of competition with 
others; “Looking smart may cause others to view me as a threat”), resulting in a 
fear of negative evaluation. 
However, positive social appraisals were only associated with fear of 
negative evaluation in the present study and not fear of positive evaluation, what 
explains this differential association? Research suggests that SAIs discount 
positive feedback in general, but that fear of positive evaluation may induce 
individuals to discount this feedback to avoid social reprisal, whereas fear of 
negative evaluation is not associated with disqualification of positive feedback 
due to a concern for social reprisal (Weeks & Howell, 2012). 
 It is possible that in the present study, those with higher fear of positive 
evaluation discounted and minimized positive outcomes and this disqualification 
of positive feedback led to a lack of association of positive social appraisals with 
fear of positive evaluation. This account fits with the evolutionary perspective in 
that fear of negative evaluation keeps one from moving too low in the social 
hierarchy (thus, discounting anticipatory positive social impressions would be 
counterproductive) and fear of positive evaluation is a mechanism in which keeps 
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one from moving too high in the social hierarchy (thus, discounting anticipatory 
positive social impression would be productive in that one avoids an upshift in the 
social hierarchy; Weeks & Howell, 2012; Gilbert, 2001).  
Also consistent with the evolutionary account of social anxiety, negative 
self-related and other-related anticipatory social appraisals were positively 
associated with fear of negative evaluation. An anticipated negatively conveyed 
impression may bring a further decline in a socially anxious individual whom 
already perceives themselves to be low in social rank, the exaggerated 
anticipated extent of this may result in further fears of negative evaluation 
(Gilbert, 2001). Accordingly, the present results suggest that socially anxious 
individuals may also anticipate others to react nearly as negatively in response to 
the undesirably conveyed impression. Interestingly, self-negative anticipatory 
social appraisals were predictive of fear of positive evaluation, but other-negative 
anticipatory social appraisals were not.  
Exaggerated self-negative anticipatory social appraisals may induce a fear 
of positive evaluation insofar as socially anxious individuals believe that positive 
evaluation may lead to negative, undesirable social impressions, including social 
reprisal (Weeks & Howell, 2012), due to the perceived heightened, and thus 
unreachable, social expectations that socially anxious individuals think positive 
impressions bring (Wallace & Alden, 1997). Indeed, one may not fear positive 
evaluation if one does not exaggerate the negative social outcomes that may 
result from positive social evaluations. However, the present study suggests that 
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other-negative anticipatory social appraisals are not as critical in the 
development of fear of positive evaluation. This finding is seemingly at odds with 
research indicating that fear of positive evaluation is associated with concerns of 
social appraisal, if this is the case, then we would expect that other-negative 
appraisals would be predictive of fear of positive evaluation (Weeks & Howell, 
2012). However, fear of positive evaluation is a cognitive mechanism associated 
with fear of an increase in social status, and negative impressions have no 
relevance for increases in social status. Accordingly, the present study found no 
association between the impact of negative impression on others and fear of 
positive evaluation, supporting an evolutionary account of social anxiety.  
It is important to address an alternative interpretation of the results from 
the evolutionary perspective. Namely, that in anticipation of conveying a positive 
or negative social impression, individuals may either overestimate the increase 
(e.g., “I will look very smart and everyone will notice and admire me, and I 
therefore cannot adhere to this admiration”) or overestimate the decrease in their 
position in the social hierarchy (e.g., “I will look very stupid and thus lose all of my 
friends”)—and this alone may be enough to induce fears of positive and negative 
evaluation. However, individuals may also overestimate their inability to obtain 
social resources after a decrease in social status (e.g., “I will never make friends 
after I look stupid”), or defend social gains after an increase in social status (e.g., 
“People will not think I’m very smart, but I cannot adhere to their admiration 
anyway”).  
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It is thus unclear if exaggerated social appraisals found in the present 
study stem from individuals’ overestimation of social ranking shifting or 
underestimation of abilities to cope with this social rank shifting (e.g., it is not the 
social rank but perceived perception that one is incapable of coping with any rank 
shifting). It is possible that in the present study, self-related appraisals are 
measuring anticipated social ranking shifting (e.g., “I will gain or lose valuable 
social resources”), and other-related appraisals are measuring perceived inability 
to cope with such rank shifting due to anticipated dramatic reactions from others 
(e.g., “Others will see me a very stupid and thus I will never gain their friendship,” 
“Others will see me as very smart and thus I will disappoint them”).  
The present study cannot conclude that anticipatory overestimates in 
social ranking is the cause of fears of evaluation. However, it is reasonable to 
assume that the greater overestimation of social ranking shifting that an 
impression is expected to bring the greater the likelihood that an individual will 
perceive themselves as incapable of defending or acquiring social gains (e.g. an 
anticipated change in social status so high or low it is impossible to cope). From 
this view, exaggerated expected social rank shifting may account for the 
association between anticipatory social appraisals and fear of negative and 
positive evaluation found in the present study. In this sense, it is suggested that 
social appraisals can be conceptualized as exaggerated upward or downward 
shifts in the social hierarchy. 
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Implications and Future Directions 
It is important to also address the proximate cause of such exaggerated 
anticipatory social appraisals. Socially anxious individuals expect that others will 
have higher standards after a positive impression (Wallace & Alden, 1997), but 
may also perceive that others have greater expectations before a positive 
impression is conveyed (Wallace & Alden, 1991). Exaggerated self-positive 
appraisals may stem from SAIs perceptions that social standards are high and 
rigid; thus the mere perception of meeting such standards (i.e., conveying a 
positive impression) may result in an exaggerated anticipatory social appraisal. 
On the other hand, however, SAIs may set high social standards because of an 
underlying appraisal that the achievement of such elevated social standards will 
result in an increased social impact, an inflated shift in social status (Gilbert, 
2001). Future research may benefit from the manipulation of social appraisals 
and social standards to parse out the directionality of such phenomena. 
It has also been argued that inflated social appraisals about the costs of a 
negative impression may stem from core beliefs regarding SAIs perception of 
themselves as inherently defective and that anticipatory exposure of this 
defectiveness may result in anticipated disastrous social consequences 
(Moscovitch et al., 2015). This may well be the case, but the negative association 
between other-positive social appraisals and fear of negative evaluation found in 
the present study suggests that SAIs may continually view themselves as 
incapable of impacting others impressions positively, which could possibly create 
 61 
 
a sense of defective self or stem from a sense of defective self, or both. Future 
research may examine the causal nature of SAIs positive anticipatory social 
appraisals and perceptions of self. 
Importantly, most treatment studies to date have only examined self-
negative appraisals (e.g., Calamaras, Tully, Tone, Price & Anderson, 2015). The 
present study suggests that although self-negative appraisals may be the primary 
mechanism through which CBT reduces social anxiety, other cognitive 
mechanisms through which treatment effectiveness may be evaluated include 
reductions in other-negative appraisals, self-positive appraisals and increases in 
other-positive appraisals.  Although the causal nature of anticipatory social 
appraisals and social anxiety is beyond the scope of the present study, it remains 
a critical question to address due to the present study’s assumption that 
anticipatory social appraisals precede social anxiety symptomatology. The 
current state of the literature is such that this question has been addressed 
through treatment studies and such findings are thus susceptible to the treatment 
as etiology fallacy—namely, that the mechanism through which treatment exerts 
its influence is the mechanism that causes the disorder.  Thus, although studies 
that address the issue of temporal precedence exist (e.g., Smits, Rosenfield, 
McDonald & Telch, 2006; Calamaras, Tully, Tone, Price & Anderson, 2015), 
these studies are inconsistent in their conclusions and limited by the treatment as 
etiology fallacy.  
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Treatment studies may establish reduced social appraisals as a 
mechanism of change in CBT protocols for social anxiety, but we cannot 
confidently establish appraisals as causal factors or consequences of fear and 
social anxiety until we directly manipulate such variables. Importantly, the direct 
manipulation of social appraisals has the possibility to answer theoretically and 
clinically informative questions. For example, if socially anxious individuals 
engage in self-focused attention to monitor what they are conveying to others, it 
seems reasonable that this may be because they are exaggerating the impact 
that their impressions have on others, relative to non-anxious persons. This 
explanation is supported by an evolutionary account of social anxiety—that when 
perceiving themselves to be in low social rank or at risk for loss of social rank, 
SAIs may engage in certain behaviors that reduce chances of this anticipated 
danger from occurring, such as self-focused attention and signals of 
submissiveness (Gilbert, 2001). However, it could also be that exaggerated self-
focused attention may lead to an exaggeratory anticipation of reactions from 
others. Future research can answer such questions through direct manipulation 
of social appraisals (e.g., the probability of being rejected is 10% versus 90%).  
Limitations 
The current study has several limitations that are important to consider. 
First, SPSS AMOS does not enable analysis of the independent contributions of 
indirect effects in multi-mediator models. Therefore, the extent to which 
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anticipatory social appraisals indirectly impact social anxiety through FNE, FPE, 
or both is difficult to determine. It is important to note, however, that standardized 
coefficients from self-related and other-related negative social appraisals to FNE 
were stronger relative to FPE, suggesting that indirect effects may be more 
strongly attributable to FNE. Second, because we modified the original 
hypothesized model, cross-validation of the final model is critical in lending 
further evidence for the validity of this model. Nonetheless, the validity of this 
model is supported by the strong model fit indices, particularly when compared to 
relevant competing models, and the fact that model modifications were minimal 
and based on previous research and theory. 
Several limitations are also posed by the study’s current questionnaire. 
First, the SIBS examined participants’ anticipatory estimates of social outcomes 
regarding intense positive impressions and intense negative impressions. 
Additionally, we cannot be certain whether we actually tapped into anticipatory 
estimates or estimates of social appraisals after the fact. Regardless, the 
intention of the SIBS was to reconstruct the anticipatory process in which SAIs 
engage in before the conveying of a desired or undesired impression. Namely, 
SAIs anticipated reactions from others when such reactions are dichotomously 
and exaggeratedly negative or positive. Nonetheless, future research examining 
SAIs estimates of moderate positive social impression may prove fruitful.  
Second, the subscales for each of the SIBS major dimensions may be 
somewhat redundant. That is, the core anticipatory social appraisals may be 
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magnitude, and probability and these may not be distinct from each other, as 
suggested by the high correlation between these two subscales. Due to the 
smaller correlations with the subscales of magnitude and probability, duration 
and self-esteem may be more peripheral, albeit important, indicators of 
anticipatory social impact. Third, the current study implemented a layperson 
definition of self-esteem, and not an actual validated measure. Thus, it is unclear 
how participants actually interpreted self-esteem. However, the correlation 
between self-esteem and the other subscales of the SIBS suggest that this 
indicator is related. 
Fourth, the SIBS measures positive and negative social appraisals 
separately. However, SAIs may have negative reactions to positive social events 
(Gilboa-Schechtman, et al., 2000). It is possible that the inclusion of participants’ 
estimates of negative reactions to anticipatory positive impressions may null or 
cancel out participants exaggeratedly anticipatory estimates of positive 
impressions. The current limitations of the SIBS notwithstanding, the SIBS offers 
incremental validity in that it provides insight above and beyond that which can 
be obtained from assessment of mere self-negative social appraisals. Moreover, 
the SIBS has distinguished FPE from FNE and this finding was not attributable to 
underlying depression, anxiety or stress.  
Finally, the current study implemented a cross-sectional design with a 
sample of undergraduates; thus, it is unclear whether social appraisals induce 
social anxiety symptomology or social anxiety symptomology induce social 
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appraisals and if these findings are similar among individuals diagnosed with 
social anxiety disorder. Future research manipulating social appraisals may 
reveal the underlying temporality of these variables and validate this model in a 
sample of individuals diagnosed with social anxiety disorder or an analogue 
sample of socially anxious participants.  
Conclusion 
In sum, the present study supports the evolutionary account of social 
anxiety—that exaggerated anticipatory social appraisals may influence perceived 
social status and social competition, result in fears of evaluation and ultimately 
produce social anxiety. It may well be that anticipated social impressions are 
expected to bring about negative evaluation due to the exaggerated increases or 
decreases in social status and the perceived consequences of such social rank 
shifting. In this sense, treatment of social anxiety may be effective insofar as 
SAIs reduce expectations about the impact of social impressions on social 
statuses.  
For instance, if SAIs estimate that a positive impression may bring an 
exaggerated increase in social status, treatment may then be geared towards 
facilitating more accurate estimations in the impact of social impressions on 
one’s position in the social hierarchy. Specifically, on one hand, this impression 
may not necessarily lead to such a dramatic increase in social status and thus no 
resultant social competition may ensue. One the other hand, such an increase in 
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social status may occur, but may be viewed from others as admirable as 
opposed to competitive.  
Because SAIs may perpetually see themselves as existing in a 
competitive social hierarchy, which may beget exaggerated social appraisals, it 
may be beneficial in treatment to facilitate the adoption of an alternative 
perspective of social life. Namely, that individuals are more concerned with 
developing relationships as opposed to judging and criticizing the SAI—that is, a 
social life characterized not by competition but by cooperation and meaningful 
relationships (Trower & Gilbert, 1989; Trower, Gilbert & Sherling 1990; 
Moscovitch, et. al., 2015).  Otherwise, socially anxious individuals may not only 
live in a general fear of evaluation, but in a generally exaggerated social world 
wherein the anticipated probability and costs of positive and negative 
impressions lead to inflated and untenable social shifts in an perceived 
competitive social hierarchy.  
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Social Impact Bias Scales (SIBS) 
This questionnaire involves people’s anticipation of making a certain 
impression. Each scenario involves social situations that people sometimes 
anticipate happening. As you read, imagine yourself in each scenario and rate 
the degree to which you would have an impact on others’ impression of you (e.g., 
the person(s) views you as funny or smart). Even if you feel that others would not 
view you this way or that the scenario is unlikely to happen, do your best to 
imagine their reaction if they did in fact view you this way.  
For each scenario participants will be asked: 
 
Magnitude Scale 
"If this were to happen, rate the degree to which you (other person) would 
feel that you are (positive or negative adjective)" on a 9-point Likert scale 
anchored by "Not very (adjective)" (0) and Very (adjective) (8). 
 
Probability Scale  
"If this were to happen, how likely is it that you (other person) would feel 
that you are (positive or negative adjective)" on  a  9-point  Likert  scale  
anchored  by  ‘‘Not  at  all  likely’’  (0)  and  ‘‘Extremely likely’’ (8). 
 
Duration Scales 
 ‘‘If this were to happen, for how long would you (other person) feel that 
you are (positive or negative adjective)" on a 9-point scale (0 _ ‘‘None’’; 1 _ 
‘‘Several minutes’’; 2 _‘‘15 minutes’’; 3 _ ‘‘About an hour’’; 4 _ ‘‘Few hours’’; 5 _ 
‘‘About a day’’; 6 _‘‘Few Days’’; 7 _ ‘‘Two weeks’’; 8 _ ‘‘More than a month’’). 
 
Physical Reaction Scale 
‘‘If this were to happen, how would this affect your (other person's) 
physical reaction? on a 9-point bipolar scale (_4_‘‘Strongly negative’’; 0_‘‘No 
bodily reaction’’; _ ‘‘Strongly positive’’). 
 
Self-Esteem Scale 
 ‘‘If this were to happen, how would this affect your (other person's) self 
esteem? on a 9-point bipolar scale (_4 _ ‘‘Make me feel worthless’’; 0 _ ‘‘No 
effect on self-esteem’’; 4 _ ‘‘Make me feel great’’). 
 
1. Your professor is talking about a topic you happen to know a lot 
about. As a result, you make a comment in class and your professor smiles and 
responds by saying “good point, you’re pretty smart.”  
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2. As you are talking to a person you have just met, an interesting 
personal event comes to mind and you tell them about it. The person smiles and 
responds with “Wow, you seem really interesting.” 
 
3. At a party, you are talking to a group of people you just met. You 
feel a little left out, so you tell a funny joke, everybody laughs and say “You’re 
pretty funny.” 
 
       4.   As you are talking with your professor, you realize you have 
something insightful to say. You comment to the professor about it and the 
professor responds with “Wow, I have never thought of that perspective, you’re 
pretty insightful.”   
   
5.  You have just met someone from your class and you have a nice 
compliment you want to give them. When you see them walk by the next day, 
you give them the compliment and they respond with a big smile and tell you 
“thanks, you’re so nice!” 
 
This questionnaire involves people’s anticipation of making a certain 
impression. Each scenario involves social situations that people sometimes 
anticipate happening. As you read, imagine yourself in each scenario and rate 
the degree to which the scenario would have an impact on yourself (e.g., you 
view yourself as funny or smart). Even if you feel that you would not view yourself 
this way or that the scenario is unlikely to happen, do your best to imagine your 
reaction if you did in fact view yourself this way.  
 
1. Your professor is talking about a topic you happen to know a lot 
about. As a result, you make a comment in class and your professor smiles and 
responds by saying, “good point, you’re pretty smart.”  
 
2. As you are talking to a person you have just met, an interesting 
personal event comes to mind and you tell them about it. The person smiles and 
responds with “wow, you seem like an interesting person.”  
 
 
3. At a party, you are talking to a group of people you just met. You 
feel a little left out, so you tell a funny joke, everybody laughs and say “you’re 
pretty funny.” 
 
 4.   As you are talking with your professor, you realize you have 
something insightful to say. You comment to the professor about it and the 
professor responds with “Wow, I have never thought of that perspective, you’re 
very insightful.”  
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5. You have just met someone from your class and you have a nice 
compliment you want to give them. When you see them walk about the next day, 
you give them the compliment and they respond with a big smile and tell you 
“thanks, you’re so nice!” 
 
This questionnaire involves people’s anticipation of making a certain 
impression. Each scenario involves social situations that people sometimes 
anticipate happening. As you read, imagine yourself in each scenario and rate 
the degree to which you would have an impact on others’ impression of you (e.g., 
the person(s) views you as funny or smart). Even if you feel that others would not 
view you this way or that the scenario is unlikely to happen, do your best to 
imagine their reaction if they did in fact view you this way.  
 
1. Your professor is talking about a topic you happen to know a lot 
about. As a result, you make a comment in class and your professor frowns and 
responds by saying “No, you need to take a look at your notes.” 
 
2. As you are talking to a person you have just met, an interesting 
personal event comes to mind and you tell them about it. The person frowns and 
responds with “is that supposed to be interesting?” 
 
3. At a party, you are talking to a group of people you just met. You 
feel a little left out, so you tell a funny joke, and no one laughs and everyone 
remains quiet. 
 
4.  As you are talking with your professor, you realize you have 
something intelligent to   say. You comment to the professor about it and the 
professor responds with “No, you need to do more research.”    
   
5.  You have just met someone from your class and you have a nice 
compliment you want to give them. When you see them walk by the next day, 
you give them the compliment and they respond with a frown and walk away. 
 
  
This questionnaire involves people’s anticipation of making a certain 
impression. Each scenario involves social situations that people sometimes 
anticipate happening. As you read, imagine yourself in each scenario and rate 
the degree to which the scenario would have an impact on yourself (e.g., you 
view yourself as funny or smart). Even if you feel that you would not view yourself 
this way or that the scenario is unlikely to happen, do your best to imagine your 
reaction if you did in fact view yourself this way.  
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1. Your professor is talking about a topic you happen to know a lot 
about. As a result, you make a comment in class and your professor frowns and 
responds by saying “No, you need to take a look at your notes.” 
 
2. As you are talking to a person you have just met, an interesting 
personal event comes to mind and you tell them about it. The person frowns and 
responds with “is that supposed to be interesting?” 
 
3. At a party, you are talking to a group of people you just met. You 
feel a little left out, so you tell a funny joke, no one laughs and everyone remains 
quiet. 
 
4.    As you are talking with your professor, you realize you have 
something intelligent to say. You comment to the professor about it and the 
professor responds with “No, you need to do more research.”   
    
5.  You have just met someone from your class and you have a nice 
compliment you want to give them. When you see them walk by the next day, 
you give them the compliment and they respond with a frown and walk away 
 
Johns, L. J., & Lewin, M. R. (2017). The development of a comprehensive model 
of social anxiety and anticipatory social appraisals. Manuscript in 
preparation.  
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Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE) 
Read each of the following statements carefully indicate the degree to 
which you feel the statement is characteristic of you, using the following scale. 
For each statement,respond as though it involves people that you do not know 
very well . Rate each situation from 0 to 9. Please choose only one response for 
each statement. 
1. I worry about what other people will think of me even when I know it 
doesn’t make any difference. 
2. I am unconcerned even if I know people are forming an unfavorable 
impression of me. 
3. I am frequently afraid of other people noticing my shortcomings. 
4. I rarely worry about what kind of impression I am making on 
someone. 
5. I am afraid that others will not approve of me. 
6.        I am afraid that people will find fault with me. 
7. I am concerned about other people’s opinions of me. 
8. When I am talking to someone, I worry about what they may be 
thinking about me. 
9. I am usually worried about what kind of impression I make. 
10. If I know someone is judging me, it tends to bother me. 
11. Sometimes I think I am too concerned with what other people think 
of me. 
12. I often worry that I will say or do wrong things 
 
Leary, M. R. (1983). Social anxiousness: The construct and its measurement. Journal of 
Personality Assessment, 47(1), 66. 
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Fear of Positive Evaluation Scale (FPES) 
Read each of the following statements carefully indicate the degree to 
which you feel the statement is characteristic of you, using the following scale. 
For each statement,respond as though it involves people that you do not know 
very well . Rate each situation from 0 to 9. Please choose only one response for 
each statement. 
 
1.   I am uncomfortable exhibiting my talents to others, even if I think my 
talents will impress them. 
 2.  It would make me anxious to receive a compliment from someone that 
I am attracted to. 
 3.  I try to choose clothes that will give people little impression of what I 
am like.  
4.  I feel uneasy when I receive praise from authority figures.  
5. If I have something to say that I think a group will find interesting, I 
typically say it. 
 6. I would rather receive a compliment from someone when that person 
and I were alone than when in the presence of others. 
 7. If I was doing something well in front of others, I would wonder whether 
I was doing ‘‘too well.’’ 
 8. I generally feel uncomfortable when people give me compliments.  
9.  I don’t like to be noticed when I am in public places, even if I feel as 
though I am being admired.  
10. I often feel under-appreciated, and wish people would comment more 
on my positive qualities. 
 
Weeks, J. W., Heimberg, R. G., & Rodebaugh, T. L. (2008). The fear of positive 
evaluation scale: Assessing a proposed cognitive component of social anxiety. 
Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 22(1), 44-55. doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2007.08.002 
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Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-21) 
Please read each statement and circle the number (0, 1, 2 or 3) which 
indicates how much the statement applied to you over the past week. There are 
no right or wrong answers, Do not spend too much time on any statement. 
The rating scale is as follows: 
0 = Did not apply to me at all - NEVER 
1 = Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time - SOMETIMES 
2 = Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of the time - 
OFTEN 
3 = Applied to me very much, or most of the time – ALMOST ALWAYS 
 
1. I found it hard to wind down  
2. I was aware of dryness of my mouth 
3. I couldn’t seem to experience any positive feeling at all  
4. I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g, excessively rapid breathing, 
breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion) 
5. I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things  
6. I tended to over-react to situations  
7. I experienced trembling (e.g, in the hands)  
8. I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy  
9. I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make a 
fool of myself  
10. I felt that I had nothing to look forward to  
11. I found myself getting agitated  
12. I found it difficult to relax  
13. I felt down-hearted and blue  
14. I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with what I 
was doing  
15. I felt I was close to panic 
16. I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything  
17. I felt I wasn’t worth much as a person  
18. I felt that I was rather touchy  
19. I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical 
exertion (e.g, sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a beat)  
20. I felt scared without any good reason  
21. I felt that life was meaningless. 
 
Lovibond, P. F., & Lovibond, S. H. (1995). The structure of negative emotional states: 
Comparison of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS) with the Beck 
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Depression and Anxiety Inventories. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33(3), 
335-343. doi:10.1016/0005-7967(94)00075-U 
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Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) 
For each question, please circle a number to indicate the degree to which 
you feel the statement is characteristic or true of you. The rating scale is as 
follows: 
 
0 = Not at all characteristic or true of me 3 = Very characteristic or true of 
me 
1 = Slightly characteristic of true of me 4 = Extremely characteristic or 
true of me 
2 = Moderately characteristic or true of me 
 
1. I get nervous if I have to speak with someone in authority (teacher, 
boss, etc.). 
2. I have difficulty making eye-contact with others. 
3. I become tense if I have to talk about myself or my feelings. 
4. I find difficulty mixing comfortably with the people I work with. 
5. I find it easy to make friends of my own age. 
6. I tense-up if I meet an acquaintance on the street. 
7. When mixing socially, I am uncomfortable. 
8. I feel tense if I am alone with just one person. 
9. I am at ease meeting people at parties, etc. 
10. I have difficulty talking with other people. 
11. I find it easy to think of things to talk about 
12. I worry about expressing myself in case I appear awkward. 
13. I find it difficult to disagree with another’s point of view. 
14. I have difficulty talking to an attractive person of the opposite sex. 
15. I find myself worrying that I won’t know what to say in social 
situations. 
16. I am nervous mixing with people I don’t know well. 
17. I feel I’ll say something embarrassing when talking. 
18. When mixing in a group, I find myself worrying I will be ignored. 
19. I am tense mixing in a group 
20. I am unsure whether to greet someone I know only slightly. 
 
Mattick, R. P., & Clarke, J. C. (1998). Development and validation of measures of social 
phobia scrutiny fear and social interaction anxiety. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 36(4), 455-470. doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(97)10031-6 
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